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absence of those pressures reduces the incentives for judges to distort
the rules in their own self-interest.
In this political system the values of individual autonomy and
equality of respect for each human being are built into the base of the
system via popular consent to the fundamental rules in the Constitu
tion-amending process, rather than guarded as policy outcomes by a
tiny elite removed from popular control. This system honors more

fully than the other does the ultimate moral authority of the will of the

Some scholars still believe it matters what political system the
constitutional text established. The political theory underlying a textguided jurisprudence is a familiar one. It gives priority to the written
Constitution and, to some degree, to what the founding generation
understood the text to mean. It is the tale told by Marbury and by
Federalist #78. In it the people in their role as electors of representa
tives are the ultimate sovereign. They adopt the fundamental rules of
the game by consenting to a written version of those rules, so that all
people will know what they have agreed to. This consent is given, at
least in the first instance, by a specially elected body of representa

tives. Governing authorities are the people's deputies, assigned to
carry out the rules. If government agents violate the rules, judges
enforce them by judicial review: They declare void the rule-breaking
statutes.

It is true that all members of the government are duty bound to
enforce the rules, but members of the judiciary have a special respon
sibility in that regard; it is "emphatically" their "province and duty"
(as Marshall noted in Marbury). In this political theory the particular
responsibility of the judiciary to enforce the rules is justified by the
judges' specialized training as construers of law and also by the
institutional structure that removes them from electoral pressures. The

people, understood as expressed through those elected representatives
who operate within the constitution-amending process. Judges are
bound to look to the text of the Constitution—that is, to the will of the
sovereign people—-for the rules that they enforce.
This picture is not so fictional as its ancient lineage may make it
seem. An obvious problem with it, however, is that we have no
institutional mechanism for formally gathering mass popular consent
to the rules.79 As Paul Brest poses this critique, why should the
opportunity for meaningful community debate over public values be
limited to 1787 and 1866—the "rare occasions of constitution revolu
tion"?80 As others81 have phrased the critique, everyone who ostensibly
(through constitutional ratification or amendment) consented to the
clauses generally litigated has long been dead. This concern underlay
Jefferson's well-known interest in holding national constitutional con
ventions every 20 years (an interest he seems never to have promoted

in any serious way, perhaps because he was a sitting president in 1807).
There are some answers to this critique (although they are perhaps
not fully satisfying). For one thing, the assertion that the ostensible
voice of the people is really no more than the dead hand of the past
underrates the degree of historical continuity that life in any society
presupposes. To some degree the rule of law always creates bonds of a
shared culture between living and dead.82 A substantial number of the
laws people live under were adopted by legislatures elected entirely by
persons now deceased, but that fact does not produce a demand that
all statutes be repassed annually or biennially. Popular acquiescence
to laws—as long as it occurs within a political system that allows the
majority institutionalized control over legislatures—can properly be
viewed as consent to those laws.83
Although the United States does not hold regular constitutional
conventions, it does allow people freedom to leave if they are dissatis
fied with the system, and it does give the public in its role as elector of
Congress, of state legislatures, and of potential constitutional conven

tions the opportunity to amend the Constitution. For St. George
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Tucker, writing in 1803, these two institutional features were enough
from which to conclude that people had * 'consented" to the Constitu
tion whenever they refrained from amending it.84

During the three antebellum decades, the Garrisonian abolitionists

emphatically proclaimed that every vote for any government office in
the United States was an act of consent to the Constitution, for the
Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 3) explicitly mandates that all such officials
swear an oath to support the document.85 Obdurately opposed to the

slavery compromises in the Constitution, this faction of abolitionists
refrained (as a point of honor) from voting. One could, of course, argue
that even today the act of voting continues to imply citizen consent to
the constitutional system. And the suggestion that "the framers" might
be understood to include all Americans who have refrained from
attempting to amend the Constitution has even been made (perhaps

not altogether seriously) in recent legal scholarship.86

Such suggestions fail to persuade, however, because the difficulty of
amending the Constitution—its leaden bias toward the past—is notori
ous.87 In other words, the voting majority may very well wish to
express nonconsent to a part of the constitutional text, or to a Supreme

Court interpretation of that text, but the obstacles of the amendment
process force the public to live with the unpopular text or unpopular
interpretation until opposition to it has not just captured majority
sentiment but has become truly overwhelming (dominating two-thirds

in each house of Congress and majorities in both legislative houses in

three-fourths of the states).88

Still, these suggestions that the public does consent to the Constitu
tion by participating in the voting system and by refraining from

amending the document can be refined to make them more persuasive,

by taking into account the broader politics of constitutional amend

ment. It is well known that the Supreme Court sometimes makes
abrupt turns in its interpretations of particular clauses. It is not so
widely recognized that two very prominent recent instances of these
turns can be explained as judicial responses to constitutional amend
ment politics. The Supreme Court radically changed the meaning of
the equal protection clause in regard to gender discrimination between
the 1960s8* and 1971.» This shift followed on the heels of overwhelming
endorsement of the Equal Rights Amendment in the House of Repre
sentatives." The Supreme Court's shift on child labor regulation in the
1930s92 is widely attributed to judicial fear concerning FDR's Courtpacking plan. That plan never got very far in Congress; but a child
labor amendment to the Constitution had achieved a two-thirds vote in
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both houses of Congress in 1924 (with no time limit on state ratifica
tion), and FDR's election spurred a renewal of state ratification activity
in the 1930s.93 The Supreme Court did not announce its shift on child
labor until 1941 j94 by that time, the impact of FDR's appointing power
had produced unanimity. But the key votes were already shifted by
1937,95 shortly after FDR's landslide made state ratification appear a

more viable possibility.

In fact, it is not unreasonable to add the president's appointment

power, combined with congressional power over the size of the Court,

to the consent-garnering calculus of Constitution politics. The Court
produces an interpretation of the Constitution. The public experiences
its impact for a while and reacts. If the interpretation is intensely and
widely unpopular, it is likely to become a matter of electoral debate
influencing congressional and presidential elections (e.g., the LincolnDouglas debates concerning Dred Scott ^ Nixon's campaign for a * 'law
and order" Court, Reagan's promise to appoint "pro-life" justices),

and ultimately judicial appointments. It is of course true that every
presidential or senatorial election contains a multiplicity of issues and

thus, even if voter awareness were higher than it is, virtually never
would present a clear mandate to appoint and confirm a particular kind
of judge. On the other hand, if a long series of elections produces a
long series of judicial appointments—long enough to wreak a dramatic
transformation in the Supreme Court*s approach to a particular electorally controversial doctrine—it is hard to resist the conclusion that
the voting public has expressed its will as to the meaning of the

Constitution.

Still, commitment to "government by consent of the governed" has
to include agreement with Abraham Lincoln's concession that once a
Supreme Court decision has been "fully settled"—that is, once it has
been "affirmed and re-affirmed through a course of years"97—it even
tually does become in a practical sense part of the Constitution. For if
the voters over a long course of years refrain from using constitutional

politics to try to alter it, they ought to be viewed as exercising a
sovereign power of choice. This assertion admittedly is a two-edged
sword, for noninterpretivists can and do argue that popular acquies
cence in extratextual decisions of the Supreme Court means that the
public (post facto) has consented to those rules as well as to rules
derived from the text. All that can really be said in reply is that human
beings are fallible. The citizenry and government of the United States
permitted a system of chattel slavery to endure for decades even
though this system surely did run counter to principles embodied in
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